China and South Asia in Xi Jinping’s ‘New Era’

Abstract: Since President Xi Jinping assumed power, China has been rising on the political, economic, and diplomatic stage in South Asian geopolitics. Policy experts in China have termed South Asia as the region with the direct link to the rise of China. President Xi Jinping announced a concept known as a ‘New Era’. The policy of “keeping a low profile and binding the time” in the period of Deng Xiaoping is different from this policy. The article aims to analyze China’s policy: the main drivers, the domestic factors and how the neighboring South Asian countries shape the Chinese foreign policy behavior will be our focus of attention in this article.

Key Words: China, South Asia, BRI, CPEC, Economic Relations

Introduction
China has always been pursuing economic, political and security influence in the South Asia geopolitical landscape. Multiple reasons are responsible for the Chinese interests in the South Asia region. China's South Asian policy has been characterized by a combination of many factors such as economic interests, territorial disputes, bilateral relationships, security challenges, and competing Indian and American influence in South Asia.

China is happy to contain Indian influence in the region through Pakistan. Pakistan is a traditional Chinese friend in South Asia. While strengthening relations with Pakistan, China is enlarging its friendship zone with Maldives, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka.

Chinese are aware of the reason that South Asia is very important for the rise of China. Even Chinese academic debate focuses on the point that South Asian importance for the rise of China is obvious and clear (Hu, 2010, p.291). With Xi Jinping in power, the 'New Era' is a marked difference from the policies adopted in Deng Xiaoping's era of 'low profile'.

Chinese also view the South Asian region as a remedy for their domestic challenges. The security challenges in Xinjiang Autonomous region (XAR) are bolstered in the neighboring Pakistan-Afghanistan border. China's main concern has been the development of Western China. Only by developing communication and infrastructural linkages with the South Asian region, western China’s development can be materialized. For this purpose, China brought the idea of “the Western Development Strategy” and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Before Xi Jinping was in power, China pursued the policy envisioned by Deng Xiaoping: ‘keeping the Low Profile’ in
international affairs. Commensurate with the burgeoning power of China, Xi Jinping thought it appropriate to pursue international affairs proactively. He started the policy ‘the New Era’ which also included South Asia in the priority list.

The article argues that China has put its South Asian policy on the high ground. This transformation in Chinese thoughts is compelled by domestic and international factors. With the rising economic status of China, the policy of 'low profile' was discarded forever in international affairs. Now, China actively pursues bilateral relations with small South Asian neighbors, bringing for the region multibillion investment and economic opportunities.

**Discourse on Chinese Neighborhood and South Asian Policy**

The Chinese discourse does not clearly outline the neighborhood, which includes both maritime and land borders. Yuan Peng defines the neighborhood in three rings. First, these are the countries with a land border with China. Second, these are 'middle ring' countries which share a maritime border with China. The countries included in the list are from the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Third, the outer ring consists of Africa, Europe, and America (quoted by Swaine).

Apart from the Yuan, many other definitions are available which are more explicit such as Qi Huai. He defines in terms of subregion: these include (1) North (2) South (3) South, West and Central Asia (6) the South Pacific (Qi, 2014). Professor Yan Xuedong uses the term ‘periphery’ and includes Russia, East, South, Central and South East Asia (written in Thomas, 2015).

However, the current discourse on neighborhood focuses on the term ‘region’. The rise of China has been igniting this debate again. Chinese scholars like Wang Yiwei also consider this in the context of the debate on the rise of China. He says that the neighboring Chinese regions are needed to be focused on again because these regions are very important for the rise of China (Y. Wang, December 25, 2013).

The point cannot be ignored that China has 13 land and six maritime borders. History leaves many scares on the psychology of the Chinese. This fact is depicted in the writing of Zhang Yunling. He says China's prosperity has a direct correlation with the peace in the neighboring region (Zhang, 2008).

Moreover, the current Chinese leadership also realizes the fact that neighboring countries are very important while linking the neighborhood diplomacy with the ‘Chinese dream’ and 'two centenary goals. Some scholars argue that China puts economic relations as the first priority. So, in this view, South Asia is far behind in importance than the northeast and the South East Asian region probably grasping the third rank (Malik, 2001).

They further argue that the policy of China has been quite traditional majorly covering security and political domains. In this view, China regard South Asia in terms of security (Ye, 2008). The recent Chinese debate has been focusing again on China-South Asia relations. The new era witnesses the strategic importance of South Asia. A scholar of China termed China-South Asia relations as a “new springtime” (Lan, 2014).

Further, policy experts also call the fact that South Asia is the most volatile and relevant region with the rise of China (Hu, 2010). China policy has been clearly delineated for the development of western China.

**South Asia and China’s Domestic Issues**

Broadly speaking, China faces three challenges. First, China is a manufacturing hub of the world. From 1978 to 2011, China experienced double digit economic growth. After that, the Chinese economy has
undergone critical transformations and is comparatively experiencing sluggish economic development of 7.3 since 2015. Corona pandemic further added fuel to the fire.

Chinese economic model created massive wealth, mostly concentrated in the urban areas resulting in social and economic disparity between rural and urban China. At the 19th party congress, Xi Jinping addressed the same fact that China is experiencing unstable and inadequate economic growth (Xi, 2007). Second, minority areas like Tibet and Xinjiang present a challenge. Chinese constitution accepts 55 minorities that account for 8.4 percent of its population. The minority areas occupy up to 64 percent area of China.

There were also ethnic riots in the minority areas in 2008 in Tibet and 2009 in Xinjiang that disturbed China's ethnic policy. This is also very important because South Asia shares a border with Xinjiang and Tibet. So, the security situation in South Asia countries has far reaching consequences for the western part of China. International media reports claim that the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and other militant outfits have shelter in the tribal belt of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border (Hu, 2010).

These militant outfits have been found as a meaningful security challenge to the domestic stability of China. Therefore, the security situation in Xinjiang and Tibet plays an important part in determining China’s South Asian policy.

(A) The Western Development Strategy

The first-time western development strategy was presented by China in 1999. This strategy covers the western region: six provinces (Yunnan, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Qinghai, Gansu, Guizhou), one municipality (Chongqing) and self-governing regions (Guangxi, inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet and Xinjiang).

Deng Xiaoping guided his nation in the western region of China. He clearly outlined the fact that ethnic communities must be consolidated and gradually, a policy should be formulated to eliminate ethnic disparities in order to make the social cohesion of China (Golley, 2007). China's western strategy invites various interpretations: some assume whether China's western strategy aims at averting the separatist tendencies, focused on Tibet and Xinjiang, or cutting natural possessions like oil, gas, minerals, diamonds and precious earth metals (Golley, 2007).

The official sources tell the other story and claim that the western strategy solely focuses on the reduction of disparity by enlarging per capita income and improving the delipidated infrastructure in the western part of China. The other notion behind the western development strategy is to enhance China's national security.

Because 20 out of 55 nationalities originate in the west including 2/3 border touches the western and central region. Chinese policy makers believe that religious fundamentalism and separatist tendencies have roots in the neighboring region of western China including Pakistan, Afghanistan, and some central Asian states (quoted in Debata, 2007). Also, the key driver of the western development plan is to enhance connectivity in two ways: one is to connect the main land China with the western bordering region, and second is to improve connectivity from the South Asian to the western region.

This strategy will pacify the 5000 km long Xinjiang border, around 2500 km long Tibet border and 4060 km long Yunan border (Chen, 2004). In Xinjan, the government had made massive efforts to assign Xinjiang to Central Asia, South Asia and Russia. In Tibet, the government makes massive efforts to connect it with Nepal.
Conflict in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Region

The security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan has shaped many trials for the South Asian security architect. A host of factors has been attached to China’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan: (1) a desire to play an influential role in the South Asian region (2) exemplary Pakistan-China relations (3) strategic stability of Xinjiang autonomous region (Sharma, 2010). An eminent Tsinghua Professor, Pro Li Xiguang noted that the policies must help the interests of national unity and security amongst Pakistan, China and Afghanistan.

In 2009, the Chinese government released a white paper titled as ‘Development and Progress in Xinjiang’ in which it has been explicitly explained that Xinjiang problem is not an indigenous but has links with the cross border and Transnational terrorism. China’s more likely concern is ETIM which has perpetrated many terrorist operations against ETIM when it seeks collaboration to contain terrorism (Xinhua, 2015).

BRI

China builds multiple projects across Asia, Africa and Europe under BRI, which seeks to acquire the dominant position in global affairs. Chinese coastal areas benefited most from the reform and opened up an era of Deng Xiaoping. This phenomenon of growth also brought forth the disparity in wealth and development across various regions of China. Some scholars call it a serious challenge for China. Chinese government fully realized this fact in 2015 on the occasion of the initiation of BRI.

It published a paper titled ‘vision and Action on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21th Century Maritime Silk Road’, it explains that the BRI, China will wholly influence the rewards of its numerous regions, accept an active strategy for opening up, support communication among the eastern, western and central regions (NDRC, 2015).

In 2017, Yang Jiechi reiterated the same strategy. He said that BRI is boosting up the regional development strategy and western development strategy. It will also deliver a robust impetus to China’s opening up. Therefore, it is the first thought advantage to boost China’s domestic economy through BRI. It will ensure progress in China’s domestic sector and industrial development.

Big data report 2017 was released by China. It says that five provinces more eagerly participated in BRI namely Guangdong, Shandong, Fujian, Shanghai and Zhejiang. Moreover, 50 percent of participating initiatives came from Beijing, Guangdong and Shanghai. This brings the fact that the less developed region of China is not participating in the BRI. So, it is a test of China’s development strategy.

China’s Evolving South Asia Policy

Relations with South Asia date back to 1950. In 1954, China and India framed the five principles of peaceful co existence. The non socialist camp felt relieved to see China in the driving seat.

So, China took immense advantage of this policy while engaging with the non-socialist countries and furthered their relations. Asia-Africa Conference occurred in Bandung in 1955 and China widely used the term and it became synonymous with China’s Asia policy. Pakistan, the first Muslim country, recognized the PRC in 1950, while formal relations were established on May 21 1951.

Chinese premier met with the prime minister of Pakistan at the occasion of the Asia-Africa conference in 1955. Both sides pledged to cooperate against India (Sing, 2003). 1962 Sino-China conflict gave China-Pakistan friendship a natural momentum. It
Muhammad Nauman Akhter

Muhammad Nauman Akhter

Muhammad Nauman Akhter

Muhammad Nauman Akhter
gave an opportunity to both sides to have a rapport suited to both countries. China's South Asian policy before 2000 was solely focused on a single dimension.

After 2000, China pointed out the deficiency of this policy and selectively enhanced bilateral relations with certain South Asian countries. Even Chinese scholars endorsed the fact that the China-Pakistan friendship was boosted after the 1962 India-China war and 1965 Indo-Pakistan war (Ye, 2008). Geopolitical considerations in South Asia explains China-Pakistan relations very well.

In 1971, it was Pakistan that was acting as an instrument in facilitating the special visit of Henry Kissinger to Beijing. Pakistan was the first state on behalf of China against the Russians in Afghanistan. Pakistan also helped China in getting out the unfavorable elements from Xinjiang (Bhalla, 2011).

During the phase of India-China rapprochement, there has been seriously reconsidering of China's policy. While addressing the Pakistan parliament in 1996, Jiang Zemin said, “if issues cannot be fixed for the time being, they may be deferred provisionally so that they will not touch the normal relations” (Jiang, 1996).

In this statement, the Chinese president was stating to Kashmir. Some experts also believe that it was the beginning of the phase in which China somehow adopted the level of neutrality towards the sensitive issues between Pakistan and India. Pakistan still remains an important partner of China. However, a different method towards South Asia has been unfolding since the start of the 21st century.

Evolution of Neighborhood Policy and ‘the New Era’

Xi Jinping first used the term Chinese Dream in 2012 and termed it “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. The idea of the Chinese dream dates back even before 2012. However, the present discourse about the Chinese Dream stands opposite to the narrative of the 'century of humiliation', it also shows that China is taking a more assertive approach to international affairs (Bhalla and Kumar, 2018).

This has created problems for the neighboring countries. A conference was convened in 2013 on China and the neighboring countries, Xi said that relations with the neighboring countries aimed at the understanding of two centenary goals and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (Xi, 2013).

It shows that the Chinese are more cognizant of the fact that economic growth and geopolitical deliberations are more important in their neighborhood. Addressing the conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in 2014, Xi Jinping thought, “it is essential to support common, inclusive, helpful and justifiable security in Asia” (Xi, 2014). Policy makers explain the statement as Asia for Asians.

While at the occasion of Boao forum in 2015, Xi presented the concept of a common destiny. He further emphasized that to build a community of common destiny all countries should esteem one another and treat as equal. In 2017, China delivered a White Paper titled ‘China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation’. It obviously declares that ‘small and medium-Sized countries want not and should not take sides among big powers’ (White Paper, 2017).

It also makes us believe that Chinese configuration of international relations is hierarchical. Xi Jinping also attaches the community of common destiny to BRI. Professor Yan Xuetong says that BRI is a way to convert Chinese neighborhood into a community of common Destiny (Thomas, 2015). President Xi Jinping also stressed ‘the strategic confidence’ primary founded on socialism on Chinese characteristics. Many
other Chinese leaders endorse the fact that it has come on the world stage.

The mixture of strategic confidence, BRI, Chinese Dream and community of common destiny has explained an alternative geoeconomics and the geopolitical and ideational context for China. However, active Chinese approach has shaped apprehensions among neighboring countries with land and maritime border with China.

Transnational Aspects in ‘the New Era’

These are the factors that need to be considered:

(A) Longstanding Problems: Land and River Borders

It desires to be understood that China’s South Asia policy has been based on consolidating its territorial integrity. In 1960, China engaged with other countries to settle border disputes. China formalized borders with Myanmar in 1960. While China do not still resolve the border dispute with Bhutan and India.

Doklam Face off in 2017 produced a situation that could be detrimental to the peace and security of South Asia. It also repeated the geopolitical risk intricated with the disturbed border in South Asia. Tibet plateau is famous for originating 10 major rivers flowing to 11 countries. Chinese also built many hydropower dams. Chinese downstream neighbors fear that China has a strong check over the Asian waters (Wall, 2013).

Inter-riparian matters linking international rivers also plague the relations between China-India and China-Bangladesh. China and other South Asian states should arrive into a recognized mechanism to agreement with the anxieties creating from this trans-boundary rivers.

(b) China’s Engagement in South Asia

Addressing the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), Xi Jinping wrote, “OBOR as wings, we need to walk together with South Asia (Xi, 2014). Chinese clearly wants to have multi-dimensional cooperation with the world.

Trade and Investment

China’s spectacular economic performance averaging 10 percent a year, China is now the second economy in the world. To increase economic activity, China believes in enhancing economic diplomacy through multiple resources, including bilateral trade agreements with individual countries and investment also including South Asian countries.

Xi Jinping noted that China will strive to enhance two-way trade between China and South Asia up to the level of $ 159 billion in 2019. India is the major trading partner of China. The bilateral trade between India and China is around $ 125 billion in 2021. Indian export to China grew to $ 28 billion. Pakistan-China trade is around $ 20 billion. China-Bangladesh trade is around $ 16 billion.

The South Asian countries see many deficiencies in China-South Asian relations. Each South Asian country has trade deficit with China. So, this phenomenon is rising and dangerous for the strategic stability of South Asian relations. An expert Song says that, “China wants to transform the imbalance through trade structures, for the neighboring countries with an enormous trade shortfall with China. China should heed care to their anxieties and take related events to recover their debt (Song, 2013).

In 2014, Xi Jinping noted that China plans to invest 30 billion and 20 billion in preferential loans to South Asian countries. China is the major investor in the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Myanmar (Chandani & Bhandari 2018).
From 2016 to 2017, data shows that China’s investment projects in South Asia were approximately $40 billion.

(A) BRI and CPEC

CPEC was the idea even thought of before BRI. CPEC was slated for the visit of Nawaz Sharif in 2013 to Beijing. CPEC was formally inaugurated at the official visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2015. The document clearly says that CPEC and BCIM corridor are thoroughly connected to BRI. Therefore, it requires closer collaboration and progress (NDRC, 2015).

CPEC was not incorporated into the BRI, however, closer cooperation was attached to the BRI. Since 2015, Chinese media, journalists and government documents are attaching CPEC with the BRI. The Chinese ministry of foreign affairs attached BRI and CPEC on April 20, 2015.

Many in Pakistan believe that CPEC is an economic opportunity for Pakistan. A Pakistani scholar Muhammad Iqbal writes, “CPEC seeks to place Pakistan on a route of high growth of infrastructural growth and afterwards handover parts of its labor industries to other countries (Iqbal, 2017).

Dr. Kauser Bengali said that CPEC would also bring the environmental cost for Pakistan as numerous coal projects have been thrown in Pakistan (Bengali, 2015). According to the narrative perspectives, there are two main groups in Pakistan shaping the CPEC narrative (Saeeda & Saba, 2018).

The first group opines that “it would take the misuse and theft of Pakistani resources. They contend that CPEC is China’s device to steal the economic resources of Pakistan and is likely to principal to cultural, social and political overthrow... Moreover, they dread that arrival of Chinese goods and services will mob out local producers that will lose out as CPEC materialize” (Saeeda & Saba, 2018).

The second group including Indians, some Pakistani and international experts, contend that BRI and CPEC are the Chinese instruments to contain India (Saeeda & Saba, 2018). The fact reveals that Pakistan has inhibited its appeal to include the Diamer Basha dam in CPEC projects. Chairman Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) said that Chinese circumstances for funding the dam are not favorable and are against the national benefits of Pakistan (Shahbaz, 2017).

The Nikkei Asian Review studied BRI in 8 countries including Sri Lanka, Maldives, India and Pakistan. While India is not part of BRI. The findings are as follows: (a) debt trap fears are rising in Sri Lanka and the Maldives (b) Sri Lanka port possession went to China and consequently fear of losing sovereignty (c) serious delay in the project implementation (Yamada & Stefania, 2018).

China and South Asia: Bilateral Dimensions

In the formulation of a new era, China presents the new concept of geoeconomics and geopolitical and even the ideational framework for the world. Under the umbrella of BRI, China plans to convert its neighborhood into a community of common destiny. To manage the links with South Asia is the core of Chinese foreign policy.

China has an unsettled border with India because of it, India has been observed by China with suspicion and suspicion. Both Indiana and China’s head of state has bilateral visits which strengthen the strategic company for peace and affluence.

There appear many irritants in their bilateral relations such as India’s association with the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), border disputes and the asis of terrorism in South Asia, which has negative consequences for the strategic stability of South Asia.
India considers itself a prey of cross border terrorism from Pakistan. According to Professor Yan Xuedong, “China has only one actual friend, Pakistan” (Yan, 2016). It has also developed its relationship with small South Asian countries. President Xi Jinping visited Bangladesh in 2016 and upgraded its relations to a strategic partnership with Bangladesh. China has also been the major investor in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Maldives. These relations also cover defence and security areas.

Zhao Hong says, “in the look of India’s rising strategic influence, China line is to grow economic and strategic bonds with South Asia, safeguarding that India is bounded by countries welcoming towards China” (Zhao, 2010). China's relations with small South Asian countries, and India-China bilateral relations are the most significant in the 21st century.

**Conclusion**

South Asia is among the most important regions of Asia. Its location best suits the economic, political and security interests of rising China. Before Xi Jinping came into power, China's South Asia policy revolved around the idea presented by Deng Xiaoping: 'keeping a low profile in international affairs. It was Xi Jinping who introduced the concept 'New Era' in China’s foreign relations.

Chinese proactive approach towards South Asia was compelled by the factors: (1) the delipidated security situation in Xinjiang (2) the economic opportunities (3) the development of western China. China's emerging status also requires it to be an active player in international affairs under the direction of the policy 'New Era'.

The article also concludes that China is enlarging its engagement with the South Asian region. It has economic and diplomatic relations with all South Asian countries. China's emerging engagement in the 'New Era' has been markedly different from the policies of previous 'low profile in international affairs.
References


Surie, N. (2013). China’s growing geopolitical reach and intersection of interests with China. Presentation at seminar held in Bangalore on June 13 2015 organized by Asia Centre Bangalore and ICWA, New Delhi.


Xi, J. (2013, October 25). Let the sense of community of common destiny take deep root in neighboring countries.


Zhao, H. (2010, September 2). How does China perceive India’s rise and vice-versa? Paper presented at International Conference on ‘Emerging China-India Cross-Cultural Interactions and their Implications for India’ at the University of Hong Kong.